Don’t Abuse Scope to Hide the Skeletons in your Network

This post highlights a major friction point in cybersecurity: the "Scoping Conflict." By breaking down why customers limit their scope and offering a path forward for cloud environments, you’re providing a roadmap for more effective security partnerships.

I’ve reformatted this into a blog post that addresses common objections and provides clear solutions for complex modern environments.

The Danger of the "Small Scope": Why Comprehensive Testing is a Must

It happens all the time. A new penetration test work order hits my inbox, and the customer is asking us to test only a handful of external IP addresses.

A quick WHOIS request often reveals that the customer owns an entire class C of public IP space—and they didn’t even include their primary public webserver in the scope. In an ideal world, a quick conversation would fix this. But the reality is that the "Small Scope" is usually a deliberate (and dangerous) choice.

Debunking Common Scope Objections

When we ask why a critical asset like a public webserver is excluded, we usually hear two main concerns:

1. "It might slow down the website and impact sales."

• The Reality: We can tune our tools to be less impactful. More importantly, if a single computer scanning your website can knock it offline, that is a vulnerability in and of itself. You would rather find that out from a friendly tester than a malicious actor.

2. "We only want to test the devices that directly interact with our PCI environment."

• The Reality: Your segmentation might not be as solid as you think. Attackers love "non-secure" networks because users often reuse passwords across segments. If I can compromise a low-security user network, I can often find a path straight into your "secure" data.

Finding What You Forgot

The greatest value a penetration tester provides is finding the "unknown unknowns." By assessing the entirety of your network, a tester can uncover:

• Ghost Systems: Servers set up years ago and forgotten.
• Legacy Hardware: Systems left behind by previous tenants that are still plugged in.
• Pre-Exploited Assets: Systems with public vulnerabilities that adversaries have already used as a foothold.

Navigating the Cloud Complexity

Modern networks aren't just in your office; they are spread across various cloud providers (X, Y, and Z). While you legally cannot test these without permission from the provider, a real attacker won't let a "Terms of Service" document stop them.

So, what is the best approach for cloud assets?

1. Get Permission: Contact your service provider, inform them you are undergoing an assessment, and obtain written approval.
2. Document the Risk: If they refuse, that potential risk must be documented as a blind spot in your security posture.
3. Evaluate Your Partners: Consider migrating to providers who allow transparency. Look for those with public bug bounty programs; it shows they take their own security (and yours) seriously.

Conclusion

A penetration test is only as good as its scope. If you only look at the front door, you'll never know the back window is unlocked. Open up your scope, challenge your assumptions about segmentation, and give your testers the room they need to find the holes before someone else does.